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EXILE ON MAIN STREET...INMATE TRANSFERS FROM
PUERTO RICO TO THE CONTINENTAL
UNITED STATES VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Justin Brooks'
Its with sorrow that I have to acquaint you that I this day receiv'd my
Tryal and has receiv'd the hard sentance ofSeven Years Transporta-
tion beyond the seas. . Ifl was for any time in prison I would try and
content myself but to be sent from my Native Country perhaps never
to see it again distresses me beyond comprehension and will Termi-
nate with my life... [Tjopartwith my dear Wife & Child, Parents and
Friends, to be no more, cut offin the Bloom ofmy Youth without doing
the least wrong to any person on earth--O my hardfate, may God have
mercy on me ... Your affect. Husband until Death.
I. Introduction.
The transfer of prisoners from one country to another has a long and
inglorious history. Such transfers involve prisoners being separated from their
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2 Letter from Thomas Holden, an inmate transferred from England to Australia, written
to his wife in 1812, in Robert Hughes, The Fatal Shore 129 (1987).
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PUERTO RICO [VOL 27 #3
families , their culture, and their countries.3 To date, the most momentous
series of prisoner transfers occurred between 1787 and 1853 when the British
government populated Australia asa prison colony.4 During that period more
than 160,000 inmates were transferred from English prisons across the
Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans to colonize Australia.s The cruelty of
these transfers finally resulted in the abolition of the transport system in 1853.6
The practice, however, is still alive today between Puerto Rico and the
continental United States.
The United States government has n ongoing agreement with the Puerto
Rican Department of Corrections (DOC) which allows the DOC to transfer
Puerto Rican inmates, sentenced under Puerto Rican law, to the continental
United States.' Instead of transferring all federal inmates to federal facilities
within the continental United States, the DOC has discretion to keep federal
inmates within Puerto Rico and choose inmates sentenced under Puerto Rican
law for transfer.8 This discretion has led to punitive transfers of inmates who
are seen as troublemakers. "These "troublemakers" are often pulled out of
their bunks in the middle of the night and transferred without any due process
protections.
Transferring inmates from Puerto Rico to the continental United States
creates significant hardships for these inmates and their families. Further-
more, such transfers violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.10 In addressing the constitutionality of transferring inmates from
Puerto Rico to the continental United States under present law, this article will
3 See generally Michael A. Millemann & Steven J. Millemann, The Prisoner's Right
to Stay Where He Is: State and Federal Transfer Run Afoul of Due Process, 3 Cap. U. L. Rev.
223 (1974).
4 Hughes, supra, note 2, at 1, 572.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 572. The transfer of inmates fromEngland to Australia was known as "transport"
and criminal defendants could be sentenced to transport under the Transportation Act of 1784.
Id. at 62.
7 Americas Watch Report, Prison Conditions in Puerto Rico 6 (1991).
a Id.
9 I SmallAmerican towns have actually grown torely upon these transfers of inmates.
Appleton, Minnesota has an agreement with the Puerto Rican Department of Corrections which
has had such an impact on the town's economy that the president of the Chamber of Commerce,
Dianne Johnson, is quoted as saying "it doesn't ake much to turn around a town like this," in
reaction to the recent transfer of 200 Puerto Rican inmates to the town's new 516 bed $28.5
million correctional facility. "Everybody's excited," said Linda Holzheimer, a cook at Meyers
Cafe on Main Street. Judy Boe, manager of the town's Super 8 Motel said "we had our doubts
there for a while...people were getting impatient and pessimistic... now some of the people's
dreams have come true." Pokeytown Welcomes Imported Convicts, The Orlando Sentinel, Apr.
4, 1993, at A-21.
IQ No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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distinguish these transfers from interstate transfers. By distinguishing inmate
transfers from Puerto Rico to the continental United States from interstate
transfers this article will show that even under recent Supreme Court decisions
such transfers are unconstitutional. This in no way implies that interstate
transfers do not also have devastating effects on inmates and their families.
Interstate transfers similarly reflect short-sighted correctional policies by
policy makers and the courts.
I. Due Process Rights of Inmates
a. Historically.
Since 1941, with the decision of Ex Parte Hull," the Supreme Court has
consistently held that prisoners do not relinquish all their constitutional rights
to legal remedies. In Hull, the Court struck down a Michigan correctional
regulation which required that inmates submit their habeas corpus petitions to
prison authorities for approval before the petitions could be filed in court.2
The Court held that the regulation violated the principle that "the state and its
officers may not abridge or impair" inmates' right to apply to a federal court
for a writ of habeas corpus." The Court further held that federal courts alone
have the authority to evaluate habeas corpus petitions and that the Michigan
regulation was a violation of inmates' rights.' However, the Court failed to
identify the Constitutional source of the inmates' rights.
Following Hull, throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the Supreme Court
attempted to make prisoners' access to the courts more adequate, effective, and
meaningful without basing this access in Due Process. Indigent prisoners were
allowed to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions without paying docket
fees, states had to provide trial transcripts to indigent inmates,'6 and attorneys
had to be appointed for indigent inmates at trial and for certain appellate
processes.'7
" 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
1 The regulation provided that "All legal documents, briefs, petitions, motions, habeas
corpus proceedings and appeals will first have to be submitted to the institutional welfare office
and if favorably acted upon be then referred to Perry A. Maynard, legal investigator to the Parole
Board, Lansing, Michigan. Documents submitted to Perry A. Maynard, if in his opinion are
properly drawn, will be directed to the court designated or will be referred back to the inmate."
Id. at 548-49.
" The Court denied inmate Cleio Hull's motion for leave to file a petition for writ of
habeas corpus because the motion itself was insufficient. Id at 551.
1" Id. at 546.
15 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959).
6 GrOifin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
1" Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
358 (1963).
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In 1969, the Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee regulation prohib-
iting inmates from assisting each other in preparing writs in Johnson v.
Avery.'8 The state argued that the ban on "jailhouse lawyers" was necessary
to promote the goals of institutional safety and discipline.9 Justice Fortas
disagreed and, writing for the majority, held that the regulation effectively
foreclosed illiterate or poorly educated prisoners from filing habeas corpus
petitions." The Court held that the state must either allow the jailhouse
lawyers to function, orprovide an alternative resource for the inmates to assert
their rights.?'
It was not until the 1974 case of Procunier v. Martinez" that the
constitutional source of prisoners' access to the court was clearly identified as
the Due Process Clause. In Procunier, the Supreme Court struck down a
California Department of Corrections regulation which limited prisoners'
outside legal assistance to members of the bar and licensed private investiga-
tors.3 The Court held that the regulation unjustifiably restricted inmates' right
' 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The regulation provided: "No inmate will advise, assist or
otherwise contract to aid another, either with or without a fee, to prepare Writs or other legal
matters. It is not intended that an innocent man be punished. When a man believes he is
unlawfully held or illegally convicted, he should prepare a brief or state his complaint in letter
form and address it to his lawyer or ajudge, A formal Writ is not necessary to receive a hearing.
False charges or untrue complaints may be punished. Inmates are forbidden to set themselves
up as practitioners for the purpose of promoting a business of writing Writs." Id. at 484.
'9 Tennessee argued that the regulation was justified as a part of the State's disciplinary
administration of the prisons because writ writers are sometimes a menace to prison discipline
and their petitions are often so unskilled as to be a burden on the courts which receive them. Id.
at 486. The Court admitted that prison discipline and administration are state functions subject
to federal authority only where paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene.
However, the Court had made it clear in previous cases that in instances where state regulations
applicable to inmates conflict with such rights, the regulations may be invalid. Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546 (1941); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)(the practice of racially
segregating prisoners held unconstitutional). The Court found that the Tennessee regulation
prohibiting inmates from helping each other write writs deprived inmates of the constitutionally
and statutorily protected availability of the writ of habeas corpus. 393 U.S. at 489.
20 Id. at 487. The majority wrote that "for all practical purposes, if such prisoners cannot
have the assistance of a 'jailhouse lawyer,' their possible valid constitutional claims will never
be heard in any court." Id. The Court noted that normally it is the practice in federal courts to
appoint counsel in post-conviction proceedings only after a court has decided that issues in a
petition for post-conviction relief call for an evidentiary hearing. a
21 Id. at 489-90. The Court noted, without commenting on the merits of these programs,
that otherjurisdictions provided alternatives to the assistanceprovided by inmates such as public
defenders to consult with prisoners about their habeas corpus petitions, senior law students to
interview and advise inmates, and volunteer attorneys. Tennessee, however, provided none of
these services. Id. at 489.
n 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
2 The regulation provided: "Investigators for an attorney-of-record will be confined to
not more than two. Such investigators must be licensed by the State or must be members of the
State Bar. Designation must be made in writing by the Attorney." Id. at 419.
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of access to the court under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,
because it imposed a "substantial burden on the right of access to the courts."U
The Court recognized that prison administrators do not have to adopt every
policy and practice that may facilitate prisoner access to the courts, but must
balance the right of access against penal administrative interests."
Also, in 1974, the Supreme Court expanded due process protections of
inmates to disciplinary proceedings in Wolff v. McDonnell,26 invalidating a
Nebraska policy which allowed correctional officials to take away inmates'
good-time credits27 without any substantial due process protections? The
Court found that inmates were not entitled to the same procedural protections
as are parolees at parole revocation hearings," and that there is no constitu-
tional right to good time credit.0 However, the Court held that if the
Department of Corrections granted good-time credit, they could not just
revoke it without due process protections.' Justice White wrote that if the
state creates a right to good-time, then the "prisoner's interest has real
substance and is sufficiently embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment
2A Id. at 419. The Court found that the prison regulation effectively prohibited attorneys
from using law students or otherparaprofessionals for attorney-client interviews and othertasks.
This substantially burdened inmates' constitutional right of access to the courts because it would
deter some lawyers from representing prisoners. Id. at 420.
2 Id. The Court applied this balancing test to the California regulation and found that
the absolute ban on the use of law students and other paraprofessionals everely restricted
inmates' right of access to court without any substantial penal justification. Id. at 421. The Court
wrote that:
[T]he constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the
requirement hat prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge
unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional
rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and
receive the assistance of attorneys. Id. at 419.
26 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
27 Good time credit is time subtracted from an inmate's sentence for, "good behavior and
faithful performance of duties while confined" in prison, or "for especially meritorious behavior
or exceptional performance of his duties" while in the facility. 418 U.S. at 546, n.6.
28 The Department of Corrections argued that the procedures for disciplining prisoners
are a matter of policy raising no constitutional issues. The constitutionally deficient process
afforded to inmates reflected this philosophy. Id. at 545-53.
9 The Supreme Court has ruled that revocation of parole implicates a significant liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, parolees are entitled to certain due
process protections including: (a) written notice of violation; (b) disclosure of evidence; (c) the
opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a written statement including
evidence relied upon if parole is revoked. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
20 418 U.S. at 557.
31 Id.
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'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the
circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause.""
The Court also extended the right to use jailhouse lawyers not only in
habeas corpus actions, but in civil rights complaints.33 Citing Johnson v. Avery
for the proposition that the Due Process Clause requires policies consistent
with affording inmates the opportunity to present allegations of violations of
constitutional rights, Justice White wrote, "it is futile to argue that the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme than does
the Great Writ." 34
In the 1977 case of Bounds v. Smith,' the Supreme Court extended
inmates' due process rights beyond mandating unimpeded motions and writs,
and required that inmates have access to legal resources. The Court, relying
upon Younger v. Gilmore," held that:
[Tjhe fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."
The Court reasoned that if attorneys need access to legal resources in order
to provide competent legal advice, then inmates must be afforded the same
opportunity in order to make their access to court truly meaningful.38 The
Court held that this could be accomplished by providing inmates with either
law libraries or assistance of legal counsel."
In 1985, the due process rights of inmates in connection with the establish-
ment of an evidentiary review standard for disciplinary hearings was ad-
n Id The Supreme Court found that inmates were entitled to written notice, a written
statement as to the evidence relied upon, the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, and the
opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional
safety. Id at 564-66, The Court did not grant inmates the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, a decision vehemently opposed by the dissent. Id. at 584-90 (Marshall., I. dissenting).
n 418 U.S. at 579.
3 Id.
3s 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
3 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (States are constitutionally mandated to protect the rights of
prisoners to access to the courts by providing them with law libraries or alternative sources of
legal knowledge).
3 Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
n' Id at 825-28. The Courtdiscussed thefactthatit is often more important that a prisoner
complaint is not frivolous and meets all procedural requirements since its sufficiency is
scrutinized before allowing the inmate to proceed informa pauperis. Also, without a library, an
inmate will not be able to rebut the State's arguments. Id at 826.
9 430 U.S. at 828.
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dressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Walpole v. Hill40 . The Court
reasoned that there had to be "some" standard in order to prevent arbitrary
deprivations of rights.4'
The critical question, which is answered affirmatively by the Supreme
Court in all of these cases, is whether or not the asserted right of the inmates
implicates the Due Process Clause. In terms of transferring inmates, the Court
has not been as generous. However, the transfer cases still indicate that an
inmate transfer from Puerto Rico to the continental United States implicates
the Due Process Clause.
b. Due Process Rights Implicated by Inmate Transfers
In 1976, the Supreme Court addressed the due process rights of inmates
in intrastate transfers in the case of Meachum v. Fano.5 This case was brought
by six inmates in Massachusetts who were transferred intrastate to a facility
with much less favorable living conditions as a result of allegations that they
had been involved in criminal activities within the prison Before being
transferred, the inmates were given hearings, but they were neither allowed to
hear nor were they given transcripts, of all the testimony used against them."
The inmates brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that they had
been deprived of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment because they had been ordered transferred to a less
favorable institution without an adequate fact-finding hearing.
" 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
41 Id. Clearly the "some evidence" standard is far below the standards set in non-
correctional tribunals. In this case, the standard was satisfied by eyewitness testimony from a
correctional officer that he saw the defendant inmate flee the area where an inmate had just been
assaulted. Id. at 456-57.
42 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
43 Id. at 217. Based on reports from informants, it was alleged that the six inmates were
involved in nine serious fires inside the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.
Ultimately; five of the six inmates were ordered transferred from Norfolk, a medium-security
facility, to Walpole, a maximum-security facility, while the remaining inmate was ordered
transferred to Bridgewater, another medium-security facility. Id. at 220-21.
" The inmates, afterbeing placed in segregation, were brought before the Norfolk Prison
Classification Board for individual classification hearings to determine whether they should be
transferred. Notice was given, and each of the six was represented by counsel. Outside of the
inmates' presence, the Board heard testimony from the Norfolk prison superintendent who
repeated the information gathered from informants. Each inmate was told that this information
supported the charges that had been brought. None of the inmates was given a transcript or
summary of this testimony. Each inmate was then allowed to present evidence on his own behalf.
During the final stage of the hearing, a social worker testified about their general prison conduct
and prior rules infractions in their presence. Id. at 216-18. The Court did not reach the issue
whether these hearings were adequate. Id. at 223.
4s 427 U.S. at 222.
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The Court held that there must be a "grievous loss visited upon a person
by the State ... to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause."4 6 The Court further found that in an intrastate transfer, there is no
"grievous loss" visited upon an inmate, and that a valid conviction diminishes
an inmate's liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to such an extent
that the Due Process Clause is not implicated by an intrastate transfer.
In addressing whether Massachusetts tate law created a liberty interest
similar to the right to good-time credit created in Wolf the Court held that there
was no such liberty interest created.48 Therefore, no due process rights existed
entitling a hearing before being transferred.49 The three dissenting judges
objected strongly to the majority limiting the source of liberty so that it is "no
greater than the State chooses to allow." 0
Similarly, in the companion case of Montayne v. Haymes,5 the Court
decided that an inmate transferred several hundred miles within New York
from the Attica Correctional facility to the Clinton Correctional facility had
neither a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause nor a similar liberty
interest under New York state law.2 The Court held that if the conditions or
4 Id. at 224.
4 Id. at 224. The Court stated that a valid criminal conviction extinguishes a defendant's
liberty interest The State may confine him in any of its prisons and subject him to the rules of
its prison system so long as the other conditions of confinement are constitutional. Id. The Court
was also concerned with prison security and rejected the argument that any substantial
deprivation an inmate suffered at the hands of prison officials would trigger the protections of
the Due Process Clause because such a standard would open tojudicial review a "wide spectrum"
of actions that have traditionally been left to prison administrators rather than the federal courts.
Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
48 Id at 224.
4 Id. at 226. The Court explained that the state may create liberty interests by statute
that do not have their origins in the Constitution. Id. Once a State has given prisoners a liberty
interest, due process protections are necessary "to insure that the state-created right is not
arbitrarily abridged." Wolfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,557 (1974)(State-created rightto good-
time credits, which could be withdrawn only for serious misconduct, constituted a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause). See also, Morrissey v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 471
(1972)(State-created right to parole constituted a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, therefore parole could not be revoked without a hearing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973)(State-created right to probation created a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause and therefore probation may not be withdrawn without a hearing). Unlike the
situations in Wolff Morrissey, and Gagnon, Massachusetts law had not given prisoners the right
to stay in the prisons they had originally been assigned to, therefore they were not entitled to any
procedural protections before being transferred. 427 U.S. at 225-27.
5o Id. at 233.
.5 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
$ Id. at 242-43. As in Meachun, the Court found that a validly convicted prisoner has
no Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest implicated when he is transferred from one prison
facility to another within the state whether with or without a hearing, absent some justifiable
expectation rooted in state law that he will not be transferred except upon the occurrence of
misconduct or other specified events. Id. at 242.
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degree of confinement imposed on the inmate is within the sentence originally
imposed, and if the conditions are not otherwise violative of the Constitution,
the Due Process Clause will have no bearing on the transfer.53
In 1980, the Supreme Court once again addressed the intrastate involun-
tary transfer of a Nebraskan inmate in Vitek v. Jones.? However, the issue
in Vitek was whether transferring an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital
implicates the Due Process Clause.55 The Court held that this transfer did
implicate a liberty interest because the transfer stigmatized the inmate, and
was such a major change in his conditions of confinement that it constituted
a grievous loss.' The Court also found that there was a liberty interest contrary
to such a transfer grounded in Nebraskan law,5 and, therefore, that due
process protections must be afforded."
In 1983, the Court addressed changing conditions of confinement without
sufficient due process in the case of Hewitt v. Helms.59 In that case, an inmate
" Id.
54 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
ss Id. at 484.
56 Id. at 488. The Court reasoned that an ordinary citizen would be entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment dueprocess protection before beingplaced involuntarily in amental institution, and
that a convicted criminal's liberty interest was not extinguished to such an extent that he should
be denied this basic due process. Id. at 492-93. The Court also concluded that the inmate's
interest in not being capriciously classified as mentally ill and in avoiding forced treatment
outweigh the prison administration's interest in separating and treating mentally ill residents.
Id. at 495.
5 Id. at 487-88. R.R.S.Neb. 1943, § 83-180 provides thatif a physician finds a prisoner
"suffers from a mental disease or defect" that "cannot be given proper treatment" in prison, the
Director of Correctional Services may transfer him to a mental hospital. The Court found that
this gave a prisoner a reasonable expectation that he would not be transferred to a mental hospital
without a finding that he was suffering from a mental disease for which there was no adequate
treatment available in the correctional facility. 445 U.S.at489-90. When a State gives a prisoner
a right or expectation that adverse action will not be taken against him except upon the
occurrence of specified behavior, the "determination of whether such behavior has occurred
becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the
circumstances must be observed." 418 U.S. at 558.
5 In orderto afford sufficient protection of the liberty interest involved in a transfer from
prison to a mental institution, the Court held that Nebraska Department of Corrections must
provide: (1) written notice; (2) a hearing at which evidence relied on for transfer is presented and
during which the inmate is given an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence; (3) an
opportunity for the inmate to present witnesses and cross-examine state witnesses, unless there
is good cause not to allow cross-examination; (4) an independent decision maker; (5) a written
statement of decision, evidence relied upon, and reason for the transfer; (6) availability of legal
counsel in preparing adefense; and (7) effective and timely notice of all ofthese rights. The Court
went beyond former cases where prisoners faced transfer hearings by requiring that counsel be
provided to indigent inmates. The Court ruled that this was necessary because inmates facing
involuntary transfer to mental hospitals probably had a greater need for assistance in understand-
ing their legal rights. Id. at 495-97.
* 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
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was placed in solitary confinement as a result of charges that he had been
involved in a prison riot. Once again, the Court declared that the movement
of an inmate to a more restrictive and less desirable confinement does not, in
itself, implicate the protections of the Due Process Clause."' Furthermore,
although the Court decided that Pennsylvania law created a liberty interest
because of the mandatory language in its regulations controlling the process
of segregating inmates,2 the Court still found the process constitutionally
adequate.6 3
Also in 1983, the Supreme Court decided Olim v. Wakinekona.t
Wakinekona was an inmate serving a life without parole sentence in Hawaii
as a result of a murder conviction in a Hawaiian state court. In August 1976,
he was transferred 2500 miles across the Pacific Ocean from the Hawaii State
Prison to Folsom State Prison in California, as a result of a classification
hearing which stemmed from an investigation into discipline problems within
* Id. at 463-65. Hewitt was placed in "administrative segregation" pending an
investigation into his involvement in the riot. He remained in administrative segregation forover
seven weeks before an evidentiary hearing was held, and was then sentenced to six months in
"disciplinary custody." Id. at 462-65.
61 Id. at 466-67. The Court employed the test used in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) and weighed (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the government interests
involved; and (3) the value of the procedural requirements in determining what process is due
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court determined that Hewitt's private interest was "not
one of great consequence" because he was "merely being transferred from one extremely
restricted environment to an even more confined situation." 459 U.S. at 473. Also, the Court
found that the government had a strong interest in protecting prison officials and other inmates
from dangerous prisoners, and that the choice to detain Hewitt in solitary confinement wouldn't
have been helped by a detailed adversarial proceeding because the decision that an inmate is a
threat to institutional security is an "intuitive" one rather than one that would benefit from a trial-
type procedure. Id. at 474.
a Title 37 Pa.Code 95.104(b)(1) (1978) provides: "An inmate who has allegedly
committed a Class I Misconduct may be placed in Close or Maximum Administrative Custody
upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution, not routinely but based upon his
assessment of the situation and the need for control pending application of procedures under §
95.103 of this title." Title 37 Pa. Code. § 95.104(b)(3) (1978) provides: "An inmate may be
temporarily confined to Close or Maximum Administrative custody in an investigative status
upon approval of the officer in charge of the institution where it has been determined that there
is a threat of serious disturbance, or a serious threat to the individual or others. The inmate shall
be notified in writing as soon as possible that he is under investigation and that he will receive
a hearing if any disciplinary action is being considered after the investigation is completed. An
investigation shall begin immediately to determine whether or not a behavior violation has
occurred. Ifno behavior violation has occurred, the inmate mustbereleased as soon as the reason
for the security concern has abated but in all cases within ten days."
61 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that an "informal, non-adversary
evidentiary review" with notice and an opportunity for inmates to present their views was
sufficient. 459 U.S. at 476. Cf, Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) and Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480 (1980).
6 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
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the Hawaii State Prison.65 Wakinekona was singled out as a troublemaker by
a committee, was given notice of the classification hearing, and retained
counsel to represent him at the hearing.6 The hearing, however, was
conducted by the same committee members who had handled the initial
investigation into the breakdown ofdiscipline and had singled out Wakinekona.
Wakinekona filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a due process violation
due to the committee's bias against him.67
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, found that there was not a liberty
interest implicated by the interstate transfer because imprisonment in another
State is "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has
authorized the State to impose.. even though the transfer involved long
distances and an ocean crossing."68 Furthermore, the Court found that "the
difference between such a transfer and an intrastate or interstate transfer of
shorter distances is a matter of degree, notof kind."69 Therefore, since a liberty
interest was not infringed upon, Wakinekona was not entitled to any protection
under the Due Process Clause itself.70
In addressing whether Hawaiian law created a liberty interest, the Court
determined that Hawaiian law placed no substantive limitations on the transfer
of inmates. Therefore, the state could transfer inmates for any reason or no
reason at all.'
III. Inmate Transfers from Puerto Rico to the Continental United States
While it might seem that Olim sounds the death knell for the argument that
long-distance transfers of inmates across oceans implicate the Due Process
65 Id. at 240-4 1.
66 Id. at 241.
67 Paragraph 3 of Rule IV of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Correc-
tions Division of Hawaii requires a hearing prior to a prison transfer involving a "grievous loss
to the inmate." The Administrator, under 12 of the Rule, is required to establish "an impartial
Program Committee" made up of three members who "were not actively involved in the process
by which the inmate was brought before the Committee," to conduct this hearing. Id. at 241-
42.
" 461 U.S. at 247.
69 Id. at 247-48. The Court noted that some of the hardships Wakinekona would
arguably face were similar to those faced in other interstate transfers: separation from home,
family and friends; placement in new and potentially hostile facilities; problems with contacting
counsel; and disruption of educational and rehabilitative programs. Id. at 248, n.9.
7o Id. at 248.
71 Id. at 249-51. The Court stated that the inmate had to show "that particularized
standards or criteria guide the State's decision makers," and here there were no such standards
or criteria. Id at 249.
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Clause, the Due Process Clause is, in fact, implicated when an inmate is
transferred from Puerto Rico to the continental United States because: 1)
Puerto Rico is not a state, and the Supreme Court clearly excludes the issue of
transferring inmates from Puerto Rico to the continental United States from the
holding in Olim, 2) a liberty interest is implicated since Puerto Rico's
historical status vis A vis the United States is so ambiguous that there is an
expectation on the part of inmates that they will not be transferred contrary to
the situation in Olim; 3) there is a liberty interest founded in Puerto Rican law
contrary to transfer; and 4) the practice of transferring inmates from Puerto
Rico to the continental United States implicates the Due Process Clause
because it involves qualitatively different conditions of confinement.
a. Olim
In Olim, the Supreme Court specifically refers to interstate transfers
throughout the decision.' The Olim decision is, therefore, not binding on a
ruling regarding the application of the Due Process Clause to a transfer from
Puerto Rico to the continental United States, because Puerto Rico is not a state.
In fact, the Court specifically states in Olim that:
[A] conviction, whether in Hawaii, Alaska, or one of the 48 contigu-
ous states, empowers the State to confine the inmate in any penal
institution in any State unless there is state law to the contrary or the
reason for confining the inmate in a particular institution is itself
constitutionally impermissible.
Puerto Rico was not excluded from the Oim decision by an inadvertent use
of the term "interstate transfer". The Court excluded Puerto Rico by explicitly
stating that the ruling was applicable regarding transfers between Hawaii,
Alaska, and the contiguous 48 states.4 To understand the qualitative distinc-
tions between inter-state transfers and transfers between Puerto Rico and the
continental United States, it is important to consider the relationship between
Puerto Rico and the United States.
72 461 U.S. at 245-48.
" Id. at 248, n.9.
7 Id. at 248.
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b. Puerto Rico's Ambiguous Historical Status
There are no small countries. The greatness of countries is not
measured by their geography, just as the worth of a man is not
measured by his height.
--Victor Hugo75
In Meachum, the Court rejected the notion that an inmate has ajustifiable
expectation of being incarcerated in a particular state facility.76 In Olim, the
Court rejected the notion that an inmate has a justifiable expectation of being
incarcerated in any particular state. Both decisions are based on the fact that
states make agreements to transfer inmates, similar to those between agencies
in Puerto Rico and the United States, based on institutional factors which make
the transfers desirable.78 It is clear from these decisions that the relationship
between the transferring governmental entities has a direct bearing upon
whether an inmate has a justifiable expectation not to be transferred." The
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States government is not the
same as relationships between the 50 states or the relationship between the 50
states and the federal government. In fact, the historical relationship between
Puerto Rico and the United States creates an expectation that Puerto Rican
inmates will not be transferred to the continental United States. This
expectation constitutes a liberty interest which implicates the Due Process
Clause.so
After Christopher Columbus "discovered""' Puerto Rico in 1493, it was a
colony of Spain for 405 years until it was ceded to the United States in 1898
as part of the settlement agreement to end the Spanish-American war.82 At that
7 Ed Vega, Going For The Real Gold, Newsday, Dec. 6,1991, at 58. Mr. Vega, a Puerto
Rican novelist who lives in Spanish Harlem, used this quote in describing why Puerto Rico
should become an independent country.
76 427 U.S. at 228.
7 461 U.S. at 245.
78 427 U.S. at 225; 461 U.S. at 246.
'9 In Meachum, the Court validates Massachusetts' intrastate transfers based on statutes
which establish the relationship between the correctional facilities of Massachusetts. 427 U.S.
at 227. Similarly, in Olim, the Court validates interstate transfers based on the statutory
relationships between state correctional authorities. 461 U.S. at 246,
8 445 U.S. at 488.
8 At the time of Christopher Columbus's "discovery," Puerto Rico was inhabited by a
native population. The island was settled by Spanish colonists led by Juan Ponce de Leon in
1508. See Roland I. Perusse, The United States and Puerto Rico: The Struggle for Equality 3
(1990).
* Id. at 10.
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time, a U.S. military government took control of the island, and Puerto Rico
began a century fraught with political ambiguity.
The Organic Act of 1900, also known as The Foraker Act, declared that
inhabitants of Puerto Rico could choose to become citizens of Puerto Rico, but
did not give the people of the island significant control over their own political
destiny.83 Under the Act, the people of Puerto Rico had no control over their
foreign relations, could only claim fundamental liberties under the U.S. Bill
of Rights, and did not have a vote in Congress.
In 1901, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases known collectively
as the Insular Cases which dealt with the status of the territories acquired by
the United States after the Spanish- American War, including Puerto Rico.85
The Insular Cases concerned import duties on Puerto Rican goods shipped to
the United States, and were joined, argued, and decided together for proce-
dural reasons."
The most important of these cases was Downes v. Bidwellf in which the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Organic Act of 1900.11 The
concurring opinion by Justice White, joined by Justices Shira and McKenna,
spelled out the "incorporation theory" which prevailed as the general rule of
the Insular Cases." Justice White wrote that Puerto Rico would be an
unincorporated territory until Congress decided it was time for it to be
incorporated for eventual statehood.0 In none of the Insular Cases did the
Court explicitly state whether Puerto Rico was a state, territory, or indepen-
dent republic. The court used the political question doctrine to avoid the
issue." Downes did, however, establish precedent hat the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution applies in Puerto Rico.92 This precedent was
83 Id. at 16.
4 Id. at 17.
5 JuanR.Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine ofSeparate and
Unequal 3 (1985).
a The Insular Cases included DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United
States (Crossman v. United States), 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 192 U.S. 245
(1901); and Huus v. New York & P.R. Steamship Co., 192 U.S. 392 (1901). Id. at 3.
97 192 U.S. 244 (1901).
I Torruella, supra, note 85 at 48.
9 Id. at 53.
0 Id. at 55.
9 Id.
9 The Court wrote: "Whatever may be finally decided by the American people as to the
status of these islands and their inhabitants-whether they shall be introduced into the sisterhood
of states or be permitted to form independent governments-it does not follow that in the
meantime, awaiting that decision, the people are in the matter of personal rights unprotected by
the provisions of our Constitution, and subjectto the merely arbitrary control by Congress. Even
if regarded as aliens, they are entitled to be protected in life, liberty, and property." 192 U.S.
at 283.
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reestablished in the 1976 case of Examining Board of Engineers, Architects
and Surveyors et. al. v. Flores de Otero.93
Greater self-govemance came to Puerto Rico in 1917 when the Jones Act
was signed into law granting international citizenship to Puerto Ricans,
authorizing a bill of rights, and establishing an elective legislature which was
not controlled by the appointed U.S. military governors.4 The Jones Act
granted U.S. citizenship to all Puerto Ricans who did not specifically reject it,
and it contained aBill of Rights.5 The Jones Act also provided for a bicameral
elected legislature, but the governing of Puerto Rico was still controlled by the
United States since the Governor, Supreme Court, and Attorney General were
all still appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the United
States Senate.96 While it may seem that the Jones Act, in granting political and
civil rights to Puerto Rico, actually incorporated the territory for eventual
statehood, this was not the case. Puerto Rico remained as far from statehood
as ever.
In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to
interpret the Jones Act in deciding whether or not the Sixth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution applied in Puerto Rico in the case of Balzac v. People of
Porto Rico.97 The Court, with Chief Justice Taft writing the opinion, held that
the only clear right was to travel to and reside in the U.S. mainland, and that
Puerto Ricans could not insist upon a jury trial unless the Puerto Rican
legislature explicitly granted that right.98 Specifically, Taft wrote: "It is
locality that is determinative of the application of the constitution in such
matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it."99
In 1950, Public Law 600 was passed by the United States Congress, giving
Puerto Rico the right to draft its own constitution 0 Shortly thereafter, in
* 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
* Torruella, supra, note 85 at 20-21. The Govemor did have a veto which could be
overturned by a two-thirds vote of both houses. However, although it never happened, the
Governor wovid have the power to then submit the bill to the President. If the President
concurred with the Governor, the veto was final. Id. at 21.
9s Id. at 92.
96Id.
97 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Balzac was a newspaper editor charged with the misdemeanor
of libel against the Governor. Balzac requested ajury trial under the Sixth Amendment, but his
request was denied. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the main issue was the effect
of the citizenship grant contained in the Jones Act. Id.
258 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 309. Taft wrote that a similar provision conferring political and civil rights on
the people of the Alaska territory did establish incorporation into the Union for eventual
statehood. However, he distinguishes Puerto Rico from Alaska on the grounds of Puerto Rico's
different political legacy, its non-jury trial system, and the fact that it was already settled and
populated. Therefore, Puerto Rico had still not been incorporated for statehood. Id.
'0 Torruella, supra, note 85, at 127-28.
567
1993]
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE PUERTO RICO [VOL.27 #3
1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was formed when the Common-
wealth Constitution was ratified.' The Puerto Rican Constitution did not,
however, resolve the underlying question of Puerto Rico's exact status.0 2 The
term "commonwealth" was and is ambiguous. However, it has become clear
that "commonwealth" is not another word for "state."03
From 1964-1966, a Status Commission comprised of appointees from
both Puerto Rico and the United States (including Governor Mufioz Marin and
future governor Luis Ferre) investigated options for Puerto Rico's status and
concluded that three forms of political status were sought by various groups
within Puerto Rico."" The three forms were Commonwealth, Statehood, and
Independence.05 A controversial plebiscite held in 1967, with both Statehood
and Independence leaders calling for a boycott, resulted in 60.41% of the vote
in favor of Commonwealth status. 0
In 1972, Governor Rafael Hemindez Col6n created an Ad Hoc Committee
for the Development of the Free Associated State of Puerto Rico.0 7 This
committee created a draft bill to Congress proposing, among other things, to
officially change the name "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" to "Free Associ-
ated State," giving Puerto Rico full federal benefits, Puerto Rican representa-
tion in the Senate, Puerto Rican control over taxes, tariffs, alien quotas, labor
issue, ecology, etc., and the right to decide which federal laws and regulations
would be applicable on the island.'ll Even after the draft bill was significantly
watered down, it died in the Interior Committee with the close of Congress in
1976.109
In 1977, President Ford attempted to clarify the status of Puerto Rico with
the Statehood Act of 1977.110 This Act also died in Congress."' Subsequently,
101 Id.
10 Perusse, supra, note 81, at 35.
"I Although Black's Dictionary states that "any of the individual States of the United
States and the body of people constituting a state or politically organized community" can be
referred to as a "commonwealth," the word denotes a political entity which is self-governing but
also belonging to a larger political body. Although there are states such as Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Kentucky which use the title "Commonwealth of __ ,"
commonwealth does not mean state. Black's Law Dictionary 252 (5th ed.1979)
104 Perusse, supra, note 81 at 40-41.
10 Id. at 41.
106 Id. at 42-43. One basis of the boycott was the wording of the plebiscite which gave
a detailed description of the positive aspects of commonwealth status but simply stated that a
vote for independence would authorize the Puerto Rican government o claim independence and
a vote for statehood would authorize a petition for statehood. Id. at 43.
7 Id. at 47.
"I" Id. at 48.
'0 Id. at 49.
110 Id. at 51.
nI ld, at 52.
568
EXILE ON MAIN STREET.. INMATE TRANSFERS FROM PUERTO RICO TO....
throughout President Carter's administration, there were no major moves to
clarify status, and on July 25, 1978, on the 80th anniversary of the U.S.
invasion of the island, Carter proclaimed that his administration would respect
a decision by the people of Puerto Rico."" That decision did not come about
throughout the 1980's, and the status issue was merely used by the Reagan
administration to foster votes from Puerto Rico's delegation to the Republican
convention."3
The latest chapter of Puerto Rico's political destiny took place on
November 24, 1993, when the island held a non-binding plebiscite to deter-
mine which form of status was favored (statehood, enhanced commonwealth
or independence)."' 48.4 percent of voters favored commonwealth status,
46.2 percent favored statehood, and 4.4 percent supported independence."5 In
1994, the status ofPuerto Rico is still unclear, and the islanders are still without
sufficient control to elect the leaders who direct the island's policies and
political destiny, including the leaders that have the power to send them to war.
Puerto Rico is neither a state nor an independent country. Puerto Rico
does, however, have an autonomous governmental system and a culture
distinct from that of the continental United States. Inmates from Puerto Rico
have a justifiable expectation not to be transferred from Puerto Rico to the
United States because the process of transferring them into the U.S. prison
system subjects them to control by a system run by a government which the
inmate has never had the opportunity to elect. Puerto Rican inmates who are
arrested and incarcerated on the island have a legitimate expectation that the
government they have had the opportunity to participate in will maintain
control over their incarceration, and that they will stay on the island. Puerto
Rican inmates have not had the opportunity to vote for the President whose
policies run throughout the correctional system, and who appoints federal
judges which monitor conditions and policies of the correctional systems.
Furthermore, with no congressional power, Puerto Rican inmates are sub-
jected to systems created without their representation.
While it is true that all Puerto Ricans are subject to the laws of the United
States, there is a degree of autonomy in the governance of the island. The
ambiguous relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico creates an
expectation that Puerto Rican inmates will not be treated the same as state
inmates.
112 Id. at 53-54.
" Id. at 55.
1" See Choosing Status Quo; Puerto Rico Avoida Radical Change But Now May Be
Ignored By Congress, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1993, at Al.
115 Id.
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c. Puerto Rican Law
In addition to having a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,
Puerto Rican inmates have a liberty interest which is created by Puerto Rican
law. Puerto Rican law places "substantive limitation on official discretion" in
the decision to transfer inmates."'6 In fact, Puerto Rican law specifically
requires hearings for inter-prison and intra-prison transfers related to disci-
plinary actions. These hearings have not been held when inmates are
transferred to the continental United States.
In the 1987 case of Maldonado Santiago v. Veldzquez Garcia, 7 the First
Circuit ruled that the Puerto Rican correctional regulations create a liberty
interest as a result of mandatory language in the regulations controlling
disciplinary transfers of inmates."8 The court relied on Olim and Hewitt, and
found that Puerto Rican Disciplinary Rule 22 in this case was very similar to
the regulation which created due process interests in Hewitt. Therefore, the
Due Process Clause prohibits state prison officers from arbitrarily withhold-
ing such a state-created right." 9
The court held that, in the prison context, a state regulation creates a
protected due process liberty interest when it "use[s] language of an unmistak-
ably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or
'must' be employed, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent
specified substantive predicates."20 Disciplinary Rule 22 was found to clearly
satisfy this criteria.'2 ' Even in emergency situations, Rule 22 requires at least
a post-transfer hearing within seven working days after a transfer."'2 The court
ruled in favor of Ms. Maldonado in Maldonado Santiago v. Veldzquez Garcia
16 461 U.S. at 249.
"' 821 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1987). This case revolved around a female inmate who was
transferred to another Puerto Rican correctional facility without a hearing due to her alleged
involvement in "agitating" inmates involved in a fight and shouting profanities at correctional
officers. Id. at 823.
I' Id at 827. Puerto Rican Prison Rules require that inter-prison transfers and intra-
prison transfers in Puerto Rico be preceded by administrative hearings. Disciplinary rule 22,
at issue in this case, is an exception to this general rule and "enumerates seven types of emergency
situations during which the prison superintendent may temporarily isolate or transfer a prisoner
without a prior hearing," but requires that a post-transfer hearing shall be provided to an inmate
within seven working days of such emergency transfer. Id. at 824-825 (emphasis added).
"I Id. at 827, 829.
120 Id. at 827.
12 Id. at 827. The regulation requires that a temporary isolation or transfer "will never
last for more than the time required" to resolve the emergency and that "[a]n Administrative
hearing will be held. . within seven working days immediately thereafter. . . ." Id. (emphasis
added).
122 Id. at 825.
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because her hearing was held two days late under the requirements of the
Rule.123
Whether an inmate is being transferred for disciplinary or non-disciplin-
ary reasons, the mandatory language in Puerto Rican law requiring Due
Process protections for transfers indicates that a liberty interest is implicated
by any type of transfer. If a transfer from one prison to another within Puerto
Rico implicates a liberty interest, clearly a transfer to the continental United
States, with all of the heightened hardships of such a transfer, also implicates
a liberty interest. The Department of Corrections should not be allowed to
avoid providing a transfer hearing, by simply claiming that the transfer is for
not-disciplinary reasons, without allowing the inmate to be transferred the
opportunity to prove otherwise.
d. Qualitatively Different Conditions of Confinement
The Supreme Court ruled in Olim that an interstate transfer is no different
then an intrastate transfer because the conditions of confinement are not
changed."42 Transferring inmates from Puerto Rico to the continental United
States does significantly change the conditions of confinement for the trans-
ferred inmate and, therefore, implicates the Due Process Clause. In the prisons
in the continental United States, the officers, administrators, teachers, and
inmates speak English. In the legal process, the attorneys and judges speak
English. However, because they speak Spanish, Puerto Rican inmates are
excluded from the due process protections mandated by all of the prisoner's
rights cases discussed in the first portion of this article. Puerto Rican inmates
cannot obtain the services of Spanish speaking jailhouse lawyers," they
cannot obtain the services of attorneys versed in Puerto Rican law,12" nor do
123 Id. at 825.
124 461 U.S. at 247.
12 This is in contravention to the principle announced in Johnson v. Avery, that
prisoners' access to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may notbe "denied
or obstructed." 393 U.S. at 485. Inmates transferred from Puerto Rico to the United States are
effectively obstructed from gaining access to the courts because their attorneys remain in Puerto
Rico, they are unfamiliar with United States law, they are unable to communicate with appointed
attorneys in the United States, and they have no access to law libraries with Spanish texts.
126 This is in conflict with Procunier v. Martinez, which states that "The constitutional
guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded
access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations
oftheir constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek
and receive the assistance of attorneys." 416 U.S. at 419. Attorneys in the United States, who
neither speak Spanish nor are familiar with Puerto Rican law, cannot provide Puerto Rican
inmates with access to the courts to challenge their convictions and vindicate their constitutional
rights.
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they have access to law books in Spanish.2 7 Within Puerto Rico, inmates have
a constitutional right of access to these resources. When shipped to the
continental United States these inmates have neither access to sufficient
services nor access to courts.28
The qualitative differences which exist when inmates serve their sen-
tences in foreign environments is reflected by treaties the United States has
entered into with Latin-American countries. Even when crimes have been
committed in the United States, inmates are allowed to serve their sentences
in their own culture in compliance with treaties between the United States and
Mexico,'" Bolivia, 30 Panama,'3' and Peru.'
IV. Conclusion
It has been one hundred and forty years since England abolished its
practice of transferring inmates across the seas to Australia. Transferring
inmates creates significant hardships for inmates and their families, whether
inmates are transferred from England to Australia, or Albany, N.Y. to New
York City. Inmate transfers from Puerto Rico to the continental United States
not only create hardships, they implicate a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
In the face of the constitutional analysis and case law presented by this
article, it is time for the United States and the Puerto Rican Department of
Corrections to abolish their practice of transferring inmates from Puerto Rico
to the continental United States. These transfers should be challenged in the
federal courts because although the residents of Puerto Rico do not have
complete political control over their own governance, they do have the right
to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
127 Bounds v. Smith, held that "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828. Puerto Rican inmates in the United States have no access
to adequate law libraries if they do not speak English. Furthermore, most prison libraries do not
have material available on Puerto Rican law.
m For a general discussion on the legal hardships facing inmates with language barriers,
See Gregory Gelfand, International Penal Transfer Treaties: The Case for an Unrestricted
Multilateral Treaty, 64 B. U. L. Rev. 563 (1984).
1m9 Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, U.S.-Mex., 28 U.S.T.
7399.
"I Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, U.S.-Bol., 30 U.S.T. 796.
131 Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11. 1979, U.S.-Pan., 32 U.S T. 1565.
M Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, U.S.-Peru, 32 U.S.T. 1471.
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